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restraint of monopolies is part of the agency's statutory obligation or
the public interest is not included in the agency's standard.79
If the nation continues to rely upon administrative agencies as
the custodians of the public interest in some areas, the protectors must
be energized to better enable them to adequately fulfill their designated
function. Since existing supervisory agencies manifest a need for in-
creased adjustment between the policies of regulation and competition,
creation of a Commission for Coordination of Regulatory Agencies is
indeed warranted. The end result of statutory evolution in this area
should be effective protection of the public, whether by regulatory acts
or by the antitrust laws. Where supervision is not complete, there is
a role for commercial rivalry to play. Once complete regulation has
been chosen, however, no room remains for the conflicting concept of
promoting competition.
STATE TAXATION OF VEHICLES MOVING
INTERSTATE: THE INTERVENTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT
In their widening search for sources of revenue the states find
themselves subject to control by courts acting under various clauses of
the federal Constitution. The taxpayer, on the other hand, finds the
Constitution and the courts a sometime protection against what may
seem to him the depredations of money-hungry state legislatures and
tax administrators. The commercial enterprise which operates in more
than one state is in the fortunate position of having two constitutional
shields in its armory which are granted to few other taxpayers-the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause.
The mandate of the due process clause with respect to state taxes
is that a tax "bear fiscal relation to the protection, opportunities, and
benefits given by the state."' Despite difference of opinion among
members of the present Supreme Court regarding applications of this
test,2 the basic criterion has not been challenged. The commerce clause
79. "Officials of the government are aware of and, for the most part, responsive
to their duty to respect the laws of the United States and to conform to its policies.
Hence they are likely to keep their actions reasonably consistent with the competitive
policy in so far as they have it in mind." Id. at 310.
1. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
2. See Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in State Tax Commissioner v. Aldrich, 316
NOTES
requirement is not so clear. In one formulation it demands that the
states levy no taxes which unduly burden interstate commerce, i.e.,
that they do not tax so as to place interstate commerce at a competitive
disadvantage with respect to intrastate commerce. 3 Eliminating, for the
moment, consideration of differences in types of taxes and tax rates
from state to state, the competitive disadvantage for interstate commerce
is a result either of direct discrimination by a taxing state against inter-
state operators, or of taxation by more than one state which raises the
tax base on which the interstate enterprise pays above that of a com-
parable business operating wholly intrastate.
4
Another approach would foreclose state taxation which "directly
burdens" interstate commerce. 5 Still a third point of view is espoused by
Mr. Justice Black, who suggests that the problem of commerce clause
limitations upon the states right to tax should be handled by Congress.6
Pending legislative action, he would not use the commerce clause to strike
down any state taxes except those which openly discriminate against inter-
U.S. 174, 185 (1942) which argues against the distinction taken by the present court
between due process requirements for property taxes on tangibles and those- on intan-
gibles. Id. at 201.
3. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45, n.2
(1940).
4. The latter source of trouble for interstate commerce was characterized as
"multiple burdens" in the late Mr. Justice Stone's test for the commerce clause validity
of state taxes. See Western Live Stock Co. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 303 U.S.
250 (1938); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
5. This approach prevailed prior to the Stone court and there has been a return.
to it since 1946. See Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Conner, 340 U.S. 602 (1951);
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Note, 56 YALE UJ. 898 (1947).
Much discussion has been devoted to the nature of the test. The literature is so
extensive that it would be fruitless to cite more than a few examples. One of the
earliest and best analyses occurred in Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Au-
thority by the Taxing Powers of the States, 31 HARv. L. Rxv. 321, 572, 721, 932 (1918).
See in particular 572-618 and 721-778. For recent points of view see Barrett, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce--"Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," Or What
Have You.?, 4 VADm. L. Rxv. 496 (1951), and the literature cited in note 1 therein. The
crux of the test appears to be the determination that a particular transaction is or is
not interstate commerce and the injunction that, if it is, it may not be "directly bur-
dened" by state taxes. No consistent definition of a "direct" as opposed to an "indirect"
burden has as yet been developed, however, with the result that the test provides no
guide except the individual decisions of the Court under it. See Powell supra and
Barrett supra.
It is supported on the ground that it avoids the difficulty of the "multiple burdens"
approach, which lies in the attempt under that test to estimate the effect of a state tax
upon interstate commerce. "Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination
so delicate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated economic
setting which, as to an isolated tax, might mitigate the obvious burden generally cre-
ated by a direct tax on commerce." Freeman v. Hewit, supra at 256.
6. See McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 185 (1940) (dissent);
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen,.304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938) (dissent); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944) (concurring).
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state enterprise.7 His argument moves on two levels. The first is the
proposition that there is no constitutional justification for judicial re-
striction of the manner of state taxation in these areas; the questions
involved are legislative in character." The second is the contention that
the judicial process itself cannot cope with the problem; the case-by-case
approach is too fragmentary for the economic complexities which underlie
adjudication. 9
Factual circumstances rarely respect attempts to keep them neatly
pigeonholed under a specific legal heading. In the immediacy of a
particular dispute between a tax administrator and an interstate tax-
payer, due process and the commerce clause emerge as dual aspects of
a single problem which can be distinguished but not separated. The
validity of this assertion is borne out by an examination of the property
tax,10 as it is applied to vehicles which move interstate.", Analysis and
evaluation of the role of the Court in this area demands awareness of
the policies which each clause has come to symbolize and an attempt to
determine the consequences of the coalescence of those policies under the
stress of practice.
The Present State of the Law
Thus far the Court itself has undertaken the task of developing
and applying rules to govern property taxation of vehicles moving
interstate. Prior to 1949, the Court enunciated one reasonably clear rule
for watercraft, 12 and a different and more vaguely defined rule for
railroad cars ;13 the members were unable to agree upon any single rule
for aircraft.1 4 In the last three years, however, there has been a trend
7. See Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, supra note 6, at 332-333.
8. Id. at 328; see McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 186 (1940);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944); cf. his general posi-
tion on the question of commerce clause limitations on state regulation of interstate
commerce, So. Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1944) (dissent).
9. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, supra note 8, at 188; Northwest Airlines.
Inc. v. Minnesota, supra note 8, at 302.
10. The property tax, one of the oldest of all state taxes, is today of little signifi-
cance for revenues on the state level, but still of great importance for governmental
units below that level. Compare 1952 CCH Tax Systems 303, with id. at 310-315.
11. Only three kinds of vehicles are considered: railroad cars, aircraft, and water-
craft. Motor vehicle (truck and bus) owners are excluded on the ground that property
taxes on their vehicles are too small a portion of their total tax load to be of signifi-
cance. See Carrier Taxation, H.R. Doc. No. 160, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 172, 182 (1945).
12. See notes 16, 17 infra.
13. See notes 18, 19 infra.
14. The only case in the Supreme Court dealing with state property taxation of
aircraft is Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944). The vote in
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toward uniformity and clarity. The agents of this clarification, two
cases in the Supreme Court dealing with property taxes on vessels
moving on inland waters, indicate that the "railroad" rule is to govern
generally henceforth.' 5
Before the change occasioned by these cases, the "vessel" rule
provided for taxation by the domiciliary state only, 16 except that where
a vessel was operated solely within the borders of one non-domiciliary
state during the tax period, such a state was permitted to tax.17  The
"railroad" rule required apportionment of the tax base between the
states in which the vehicle operated.' 8 The vagueness of this rule was
that case was five to four and there was no majority opinion for the Court. See note
29 infra.
15. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi
Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169 (1949). Prior to these cases the same rule applied to ocean-
going vessels and to ships plying inland waters, St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11
Wall. 423 (U.S. 1871). See Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1855).
But the Ott ruling was restricted specifically to watercraft on inland waters, id. at 173,
as was the Peck holding, id. at 383-384.
16. That is, the state of the domicile of the owner. Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co.,
note 15 supra (forbidding a property tax on ocean steamers by a non-domiciliary state) ;
St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., note 15 supra (applying the Hays holding to a river
ferry); Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 (U.S. 1873) (applying the Hays holding to
river steamers where, in contrast to the Hays and St. Louis cases, the state of domi-
cile was not also the state of a major terminal on a regular route traveled by the taxed
vessels); Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 98 U.S. 273 (1879) (allowing a domiciliary
state to tax on an unapportioned base); So. Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63
(1911) (permitting domiciliary Kentucky to tax on an unapportioned base ocean-going
ships which touched at ports in several states but never moved in domiciliary waters).
In the first four cases cited above the state of domicile was also the state in which
the vehicles in question were "registered" under various congressional statutes, i.e., it
was the state of the "home port." For a collection of these statutes and discussion of
the notion of "home port" see Ambler, Personal Property Taxes on Vehicles Regdarly
Engaged'in Interstate or Foreign Commnerce, 20 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 3 n.4 and accompanying
text (1945). In Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906) a state
of the "home port" of certain vessels which was not the state of domicile was not
allowed to tax at all. The Court thus decided that, with one exception (see note 17
infra), domicile was the sole determinant of state right to tax watercraft.
As hereafter used, the term "vessel rule" will refer to the rule which had developed
prior to the Ott and Peck cases.
17. Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
18. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891) (sanctioning
an apportioned tax by a non-domiciliary state on the capital stock of the corporate
owner of the vehicles, explicitly treating the tax as a property tax on all the property
of the corporation); American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1890)
(permitting an apportioned property tax by a non-domiciliary state); accord, Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U.S. 149 (1900). Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905) has been interpreted as forbidding any taxation
by the domiciliary state of cars permanently outside its borders, see So. Pacific Co. v.
Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 74 (1911), or as forbidding to the state of domicile taxation of
that portion of a set of cars which was attributable to other states under an appor-
tionment scheme, see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 311 (1944)
(dissent). For later applications of the rule see Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Okla-
homa, 290 U.S. 158 (1933) (requiring apportionment by a non-domiciliary state within
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created by two cases which indicated that the domiciliary state might be
authorized to tax on an unapportioned base even though the vehicles
could sustain or had already sustained apportioned taxes in other states.
In New York Central Railroad Company v. Miller'0 the taxpayer
requested a deduction from the tax base to provide for those of its
cars which were operated outside of New York, the state of domicile, on
loan to other railroads "by the familiar course of railroad business."'20
All of the cars spent a portion of the tax year within New York,
which was also the taxing state. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a
unanimous Court, stated: "It does not appear that any specific or
average number of cars acquired taxable situs outside of New York.
The absences relied on were not in the course of travel upon fixed
routes, but random excursions of casually chosen cars, determined by
the varying orders of particular shippers and the arbitrary convenience
of other roads. Therefore we need not consider either whether there
is any necessary parallelism between liability elsewhere and immunity at
home. 21 1  In effect he thus overruled American Refrigerator Co. v.
Hall22 and Union Refrigerator Co. v. Lynch 23 which sanctioned taxes
by non-domiciliary states (on apportioned bases) where the factual
relationship of the cars taxed with the taxing state was almost exactly
that which exists with regard to non-domiciliary states in the M]!filler
case. 24 This process of contracting the scope of the rule of apportion-
ment with respect to the domiciliary state was carried further by the
Supreme Court in its sole decision dealing with state property taxes on
aircraft, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota.25 There the planes were
which the central terminal for oil tank cars was located), and Union Tank Line Co. v.
Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919) (see note 66 infra).
19. 202 U.S. 584 (1906). The tax was a capital stock franchise tax, but, as in
the Pullnnan case, the Court treated it as a tax on the company's property. See id. at
595.
20. Id. at 594.
21. Id. at 597. It is possible that Mr. Justice Holmes was attempting to avoid the
due process issue of jurisdiction to tax, since he did not approve of the rule restricting
taxation of tangibles to the locus of use. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 199 U.S. 194, 211 (1900) (dissent), but he could do so only by ignoring previous
cases, see note 24 infra.
22. 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
23. 177 U.S. 149 (1900).
24. ". . . IS]aid cars never were run in said state in fixed numbers nor at regular
times, nor as a regular part of particular trains." American Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70, 72 (1899); ". . . said cars were within the said state of Utah at
no regular intervals nor in any regular number . . . nor were they confined to any
particular route or routes, nor in any particular trains . . . but are and were run indis-
criminately over the lines of the railroad over which the consignors of freight shipped
in such cars choose to route them in shipping." Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Lynch, 177 U.S. 149, 150 (1900).
25. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
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operated on regular routes to seven states other than Minnesota, the
domiciliary state, where the company had a major terminal, repair shops
and its central business offices. In holding that the domiciliary state
could tax on an unapportioned base, Mr. Justice Frankfurter evidently
assumed that the "railroad" rule applied, for he claimed that his decision
was based upon the Miller case.26 Here, too, he asserted, no defined
part of the domiciliary corpus" had been shown to have acquired situs
outside the state of domicile.27  As it happened, the planes were being
taxed on apportioned bases in six of the seven non-domiciliary states in
which they moved.28  Taking this decision at its face value, it is difficult
to see what is left of the principle of apportionment as applied to the state
of domicile. Near the end of his opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems
to argue that he is not applying and would not apply the "railroad" rule
at all.20  The confusion engendered by these decisions turns upon the
ambiguous use of the term "situs". Underlying both is the assumption
that until a vehicle acquires tax situs in a non-domiciliary state it is
taxable at full assessed value at the state of domicile.30 But, if "situs"
is to have any meaning beyond indicating that a state may constitu-
tionally levy some tax upon particular property, there must be an agreed
criterion which determines the point at which such taxation may begin.
The cases dealing with this question may perhaps be read as discussions
of proposed measures for the acquisition of situs, with the facts in
each, concerning the connection of the vehicles with non-domiciliary
states, constituting the point proposed for that acquisition. But until
some standard is formulated, the assertion that a vehicle has or has
not acquired situs in any state is a conclusion that its speaker wishes
the Court to draw and not a reason for that conclusion.
26. Id. at 293.
27. Id. at 295.
28. Id. at 325; see also Multiple Taxation of Air Commerce, H.R. Doc. No. 141,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1945).
29. 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944). It is almost impossible to tell just what rule Mr.
Justice Frankfurter thought he was applying. At one point he seems to allow Minnesota
to lay an unapportioned tax because "[n]o other state can claim to tax as the state of
domicile as well as the home state of the fleet, as a business fact." Id. at 294. Two Jus-
tices voted with Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Mr. Justice Black concurred specially on the
basis of his position that, until Congress acts, the Court ought not use the commerce
qlause to limit state right to tax. Mr. Justice Jackson concurred specially on the
ground that the right to tax ought to be limited to the "home state" of the fleet. Mr.
Justice Stone and three others dissented, arguing that apportionment was required. For
an extensive analysis see Powell, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota-State Taxation of
lirplanes-Herei also of Ships and Sealing Wax and Railroad Cars, 57 HAV. L.
Ray. 1097 (1944).
30. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 295, 299 (1944);
So. Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 68 (1911); New York Central R. R. v.
Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 597 (1906).
NOTES
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The Ott and Peck cases reverse the trend toward narrowing the
application of apportionment. Prior to the Ott decision, the "vessel"
rule had been applied to the extent of sanctioning an unapportioned
property tax by a state of domicile, Kentucky, upon ocean liners which
did not and could not move in domiciliary waters.3 1 The rationale of
the decision was that, as the ships were not operated exclusively within
any one non-domiciliary state, they did not acquire situs outside of
Kentucky. The Ott case permitted an apportioned tax by a non-domi-
ciliary state on barges moving regularly between terminals within and
without the taxing state.32 The Peck case refused to allow an unappor-
tioned tax by domiciliary Ohio, where the only connection of the vessels
with Ohio was an occasional stop for repairs or supplies in Cincinnati
while the ships generally moved between terminals on the lower Missis-
sippi River and ports in Indiana and Kentucky.3 3 It directs apportion-
nent of the tax base. Henceforth the state of domicile is to receive no
special privilege, saving perhaps in the situation in which vehicles are
so sporadically present in any state as to make apportionment imprac-
ticable, upon which question the Court was silent.
Alternatives Before the Court
From the point of view of the commerce clause, the alternatives for
decision by the Court reduce themselves to three. Assuming the multiple
burdens approach, only the restriction to one state of the right to tax
or the apportionment of the tax base among the states in which the
taxed vehicle operates can avoid a disadvantage for the interstate oper-
ator. It is obvious that the "vessel" rule is a form of the first alterna-
tive34 and that the second possibility embraces the "railroad" rule.
31. So. Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 30.
32. Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169 (1949). Mr. Justice Jackson dis-
sented without opinion, presumably on the basis of his adherence to a "home port"
doctrine.
33. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952). Mr. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, cited Union Refrigerator v. Kentucky, evidently assuming the
position of the dissent in the Northwest Airlines case. See note 29 supra. He took the
statements of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Miller and
Northwest Airlines cases at face value and distinguished those cases on the ground
that there the vehicles were so sporadically absent from the state of domicile as to
preclude the application of apportionment. He thus avoided the necessity of overruling
those cases, though he had to misread the facts in order to do so. See note 24 supra.
It would seem extremely unlikely that the Miller and Northwest Airlines cases are
today controlling precedents on their own facts. To this extent the views of the dis-
sent in the Northwest Airlines case appear to be the law today. The necessity of a special
category for vehicles moving too irregularly for the application of the apportionment
process, however, is discussed at p. 219 infra.
34. The same is true of Mr. Justice Jackson's proposal to limit the right to lay
property taxes on aircraft to the "home state" of the fleet, see note 29 supra, and of
NOTES 219
The third course, that proposed by Justice Black, advocates a refusal to
act, except for open and direct discrimination against interstate enter-
price, until Congress has acted.
35
The due process clause, as presently interpreted, alters only one
of these approaches. Superficial examination indicates that apportion-
ment would seem to be required in all cases. Under present conceptions,
physical location is the primary determinant of due process jurisdiction
to tax tangible property, since the relevant benefits bestowed by the
taxing state are those concerned with property use. 36 If a state does
not provide all of the benefits involved in the use of a vehicle, it should
not be permitted to tax that vehicle at full assessed value. The "vessel"
rule, however, has found its justification in the proposition that water-
craft have such slight connection with any particular state (as com-
pared, for instance, to railroad cars) that only the state of domicile
can be thought of as substantially benefiting the taxpayer.3 7  It is
possible, then, to justify either the "vessel" or "railroad" rule on due
process grounds as that clause is presently interpreted. Mr. Justice
Black's position would be impossible, however, so long as the Court
interjects physical location as a prerequisite to the right to tax tangibles.38
Mr. Justice Rutledge's suggestion that the right to impose sales taxes upon interstate
transactions be limited to the state of the market. See his concurring opinion in Free-
man v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 259 (1946).
35. See p. 213, supra. The "direct burdens" approach to the commerce clause does
not present a fourth alternative to those listed. This is so because property taxes on
property which is within the due process jurisdiction of a taxing state have long been
held to be indirect burdens on commerce and therefore permissible under this test. In-
deed, their validity seems to have been assumed before the formulation of the "direct
burdens" test. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891);
Marye v. B.&O. R.R., 127 U.S. 117 (1888). Perhaps the first formulation of that test is
the following: "It comes rather within that large class of state action ... which, while
indirectly affecting, cannot be considered as a regulation of interstate commerce, or a
direct burden on its free exercise." Cleveland, C.C. & St. Paul Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S.
439, 447 (1894). For a more modern instance of the application of the "direct burdens"
test to property taxes see Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919). It will
be shown that, as presently applied to property taxes upon tangibles, due process leads to
the same alternatives as the "multiple burdens" approach to the commerce clause-a
"vessel" and a "railroad" rule. See Note 37, infra and accompanying text.
36. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905) ; cf.
Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
37. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
38. In the case of intangibles the Court has allowed either the state of domicile
or the state of actual usage to tax on an unapportioned base. Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357 (1939). Where intangibles are used in connection with the central offices of
a business concern, the Court has spoken of the state in which those offices are located
as the "commercial domicile" of the enterprise and has allowed taxation at full assessed
value. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234 (1937); Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
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The Position of Mr. Justice Black
Mr. Justice Black's specific stand with respect to property taxes
on vehicles is couched in the terms of the first level of his general argu-
ment concerning the negative implications of the commerce clause grant
of power to Congress.3 0 He argues that there is no constitutional basis
for the Court's assuming either the function of determining the total
tax base upon which an interstate enterprise may be taxed by the
states in which it operates or that of telling each state how much of that
total tax base it may receive.4 ° The proposition concerning the total
tax base refers to the root question of whether the commerce clause
is to be given any negative implication as to state right to tax, beyond
that of preventing direct discrimination against interstate commerce.
The essence of the multiple burdens test is the judicial equation of tax
base of the interstate enterprise to that of a comparable intrastate
business. In the performance of this function, the Court is, in fact,
determining the total tax base. To say that the Court is not constitu-
tionally justified in doing this, is to deny the existence of such negative
implications.
The other task of the Court-determination of the amount each
state may receive-is another matter. Even if one concedes the validity
of the multiple burdens approach to the commerce clause, there is no
standard in that clause for the resolution of this question. So long as
competitive disadvantage for interstate enterprise is avoided, the multiple
burdens test is indifferent not only to the choice of a "vessel" or a "rail-
road" rule but also to the portion each state receives. Under an appor-
tionment scheme, before one can conclude that any particular tax is
responsible for a multiple burden on interstate commerce, the share
of the tax base allocable to the taxing state must be determined, but the
measure of that share cannot be derived from the multiple burdens test.
Analogously, under a rule of the "vessel" type there is no basis in the
commerce clause for choosing the fortunate state which is to be allowed
to tax.
The bases for these choices may perhaps be discovered in the due
process clause, however. The extant due process ground for the choice
39. See p. 214 supra.
40. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944). Mr. Justice
Black dissented without opinion in the Peck case. His statement in the Northwest Air-
lines case spoke of the total amount which the states could collect rather than the total
base on which they could tax, but it is clear that the Court has never gone beyond
determination of the permissible total tax base. See Hellerstein and Hennefield, State
Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HARv. L. REv. 949, 968 (1941).
41. See p. 219 supra.
220
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of the domiciliary state by the "vessel" rule4 ' may perhaps be chal-
lenged, but the attack will use due process reasoning, e.g., that the state
in which the major business offices of an enterprise are located confers
more significant benefits than does the state of domicile. Likewise,
where the Court has been asked to determine the validity of a method
of apportionment, it has done so in the context of due process policy.
This is clearest as to corporate net income taxes, which have been
deemed valid without either apportionment or restriction to one state
so far as the commerce clause is concerned 4 -- due process alone requires
apportionment.4 3 The criterion used by the Court has been that portion
of the taxpayer's net income which is reasonably attributable to the
taxing state.
44
Cases involving apportionment of property taxes on interstate
enterprises, all of whose property has been assessed as a unit, appeared
in the Supreme Court both before and after the due process limitation
on state taxation was announced. 45 Prior to its introduction, the cases
were litigated ostensibly upon the commerce clause.46 Taxes upon prop-
erty within the "jurisdiction" of the taxing state, however, were vali-
dated as "indirect burdens" on commerce, so that the issue was what
would now be termed due process.4 7 The standard propounded by the
Court was that proportion of the total assessed value of the taxpayer's
property which was reasonably attributable to the taxing state.48 Decisions
on this subject have since assumed that the same standard applies.49
42. U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
43. This is true for non-domiciliary states, International Harvester Co. v. Wis-
consin Dept. of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944), but not for the domiciliary state, which
may tax the net income of its residents without apportionment in so far as the due
process clause is concerned. Guarantee Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938);
New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937); New York ex reL Cohn
v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276
(1932); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,
252 U.S. 60 (1920).
44. Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Norfolk & Western Ry.
v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682 (1936) ; Hans Rees Sons', Inc. v. North Carolina, 283
U.S. 123 (1931); Bass, Rattliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271
(1924) ; accord, Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
45. It is difficult to pick the exact point at which the jurisdictional requirement
became associated with the due process clause, but the cases of Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897), and Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385
(1903), certainly bracket the period in which this occurred. See Powell, Taxation of
Things in Transit, 7 VA. L. REv. 167, 245, 429, 497 (1920).
46. See, e.g., Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
47. See note 35 stpra.
48. See note 46 supra.
49. See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940);
Southern Railway Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519 (1923); Cream of Wheat Co. v. County
of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 329 (1920); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920).
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One may conclude that the Court has evolved the following
standard:
With respect to any particular tax there is a total tax base
to which a tax rate is applied. Such a base represents a partic-
ular value in the hands of the taxpayer, e.g. property or income,
which he enjoys under the protection of the state. For the
purposes of that tax the significant benefits or protection
afforded the taxpayer by any state are roughly proportional to
the fraction of that value which can be attributed to his activ-
ities in that state. Apportionment is required in proportion to,
that fraction.
The particular activities which are important will vary with the
nature of the tax. Corporate income taxes demand apportionment upon
the basis of the location of income-producing activity. Property taxes
demand apportionment based on the location of the property's use. The
significant activities will also change with the character of the taxpaying
enterprise. The relationship of a merchandising corporation to a par-
ticular state is not to be measured by the same factors as that of an
airline.50 Even different enterprises of the same general character may
require somewhat diverse treatment." None of these considerations
obviate the fact that, with regard to property taxes on tangibles, there
is a general standard for apportionment derivable, from due process.
With respect to property taxes on intangibles52 and others, such
50. A typical formula applied to merchandising companies paying a corporate net
income tax is one based on an average of the factors: (a) tangible property within the
state divided by total tangible property, and (b) sales within the state divided by total
sales. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-134 (II) (1950). Compare this with the proposed uni-
form statute for taxation of airlines, which offers an apportionment formula based on
an average of the factors: (a) arrivals and departures within the taxing state divided
by total arrivals and departures, (b) revenue originating within the taxing state divided
by total revenue, and (c) tons handled in the taxing state divided by total tons handled.
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION (1945) (Proc. Nat. Ass'n of Tax Administrators) 22; cf.
(1946) PROC. NAT. TAX Ass'N. 285-294 which suggests a similar federal statute.
51. A 'familiar formula for unit assessed property taxes on railroads has been one
based on track mileage within the taxing state divided by total track mileage. See
Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894); Nashville, Chattanooga
& St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940). But where the taxing state was a
"bridge" state, i.e., the railroad had no terminals within it, the court struck down an
apportionment based on track mileage on the ground that it allocated an unreasonable
fraction of the total value of the system to the taxing state. Wallace v. Hines, 253
U.S. 66 (1920).
52. Since Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939), resurrected Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U.S. 188 (1903), even though both are inheritance or death tax cases, deci-
sions following the Blackstone ruling in authorizing more than one state to lay unap-
portioned property taxes on the same intangibles are also presumably of some force as
precedents. See, e.g., Fidelity and C. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U.S. 54 (1917)
(domiciliary allowed to tax) ; Liverpool and L.&G. Ins. Co. of New York v. Board of
Assessors, 221 U.S. 346 (1911) (non-domiciliary permitted to tax) ; Metropolitan Life
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as net income taxes, 3 however, the domiciliary state has been permitted
to levy upon an unapportioned base regardless of the extent to which
the taxpayer's significant activities are located in other states. These
decisions rest upon the assumption that the benefits of domicile provide
the necessary quid pro quo for the tax. It is difficult to see why this
contention does not also apply to property taxes on tangibles. Once
the assumption is granted, distinction on the ground that-as a practical
matter-intangibles are easier to hide and so escape taxation more
readily, is tenuous at best.5 4 Beyond the field of the property tax, not
even that ground can be adduced.
It is possible, however, that the original assumption that the bene-
fits of domicile are always relevant to such taxes may be qualified. If
it is granted that the quid pro quo required of a state is altered by the
character and meaning of the tax it levies, then it can be argued that
domicile--though appropriately considered with regard to, for instance,
death and inheritance taxes-is an irrational factor for taxes concerning
commercial enterprise. Rather, the location of economic activity would
seem to be of prime importance.5 5 Since the major cases allowing un-
apportioned taxation of intangible property at the domicile of the owner
as well as at the location of use, have been death tax cases, 56 they may
thus be distinguished. A similar argument may be utilized to differen-
Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907) (non-domiciliary permitted to tax). It
can certainly be argued that apportionment is inapposite for property taxes on intan-
gibles since the relevant business activity is usually confined to one state. If one were
to grant this point, however, the state of "commercial domicile" would seem a more
appropriate choice than that of legal domicile. See note 38 supra, and, in particular,
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936), for a discussion of the right of the
state of "commercial domicile" to tax intangibles at full assessed value.
53. See note 43 supra.
54. This is extensively and convincingly argued in Bittker, Taxation of Out-of-
State Tangibles, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947).
55. Consider, for instance, the following: "It is believed that state income tax
laws should result in taxation by a state of only that segment of income of a business
which is commensurate with the economic activity performed within the state." Pre-
liminary Report of Committee on Tax Situs and Allocation, (1949) PROC. NAT. TAX
Ass'N, 241.
56. See Central Hanover Bank and T. Co. v. Kelly, 319 U.S. 94 (1943); State
Tax Commissioner v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S.
657 (1942); Graves v. Elliot, 307 U.S. 383 (1939) ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357
(1939). Cases such as Fidelity & C. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U.S. 54 (1917) (see
note 52 supra) might be distinguished not on their facts but on the ground that the
Court, in reopening possibilities of double taxation of intangibles, did so only in the
death tax area, so that those cases are not revived along with Blackstone v. Miller, 188
U.S. 188 (1903).
57. Guarantee Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938) ; New York ex rel Cohn
v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276
(1932), may all be handled in this manner.
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tiate personal from business income taxes.57 If it is suggested that the
distinction is difficult to draw in non-corporate enterprises where the
personal affairs of the owner are not clearly demarcated from those of
the business, the reply must be that, however difficult, the distinction is
required not only by a fair concept of due process but also by the
commerce clause, which must figure in any of the situations dealt with
herein. 58  The approach thus outlined approves the result reached in
the Peck case, but rejects the distinction between tangibles and intan-
gibles underlying it.50 A due process standard for apportionment is
applicable wherever apportionment itself is justified.
The problem of when to apply either an apportionment or a "vessel"
rule may likewise be solved on a due process basis. Due process may be
thought of as requiring apportionment in all situations except those in
which the vehicle in question has no substantial connection with any
state. 60 Some measure of a taxpayer's relationship to the taxing state
other than the benefits involved in the use of the vehicle must then be
adopted. Domicile, major place of business and home port vie for
recognition. The Court has thus far selected domicile as the locus of
significant benefits bestowed upon the taxpayer in such cases.
While Mr. Justice Black has not pressed the ,second level of his gen-
eral commerce clause argument in the particular context of property
taxes on vehicles, it is certainly appropriate here. The attempt to satis-
factorily administer any rule in this area might well strain the judicial
process beyond the limits of its competence. This assertion seems to
draw strength from consideration of the complexities introduced by
58. To permit unapportioned taxation by the state of domicile and the state of
business activity would be to cause a multiple burden on interstate operations. Of
course, since the "direct burdens" approach depends in this area upon the interpretation
of due process taken, its application would destroy this argument.
59. The only ostensible theoretical basis of the Peck decision is the insistence that
due process jurisdiction to tax tangibles follows the physical location of the property,
since the taxpayer argued only due process before the Ohio Tax Commissioner (see
Transcript of Record, pp. 51, 58, Standard Oil Co. of Ohio v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382
[1952], the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (see id. at 15), the Supreme Court of Ohio
(see Standard Oil v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 61, 98 N.E.2d 8 [1951]), and the Supreme
Court of the United States (see Brief for Appellants, p. 12, Standard Oil Co. of Ohio
v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 [1952]). The commerce clause, under the direct burdens test, is
indistinguishable from due process here. See note 35, supra. The multiple burdens test
requires only a choice between apportionment and the "vessel" rule. Mr. Justice Doug-
las, however, treated Ott v. Mississippi Barge Lines, 336 U.S. 169 (1949) as settling
the use of apportionment for vehicles on inland waters. He may, thus, have had the
commerce clause in mind when he said that unapportioned taxation at the domicile was
precluded. "Otherwise there would be multiple taxation of interstate operations .
Standard Oil Co. of Ohio v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 385 (1952).
60. Supra, p. 219.
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differences from state to state in tax rates, types of taxes, exemptions and
other apparatus of tax systems. So long as such dissimilarities exist, the
interstate enterprise may not be on a level of equality with intrastate
operators of comparable size and character. Its burden may be greater
or less than that of the local enterprise, and neither an apportionment
scheme nor restriction of taxation to one state can, of itself, equalize it."i
The force of this argument, however, is weakened considerably by the
reflection that nothing short of complete uniformity of state taxes
applicable to interstate business or the substitution of a uniform federal
tax can secure absolute equality of tax burden. Congress would be
unlikely to take the drastic steps necessary to ensure either alternative.
Further, the argument as to variances in state tax systems applies against
the "multuiple burdens" approach alone, as it is only that test which
attempts to equalize the relative positions of intrastate and interstate
commerce. The "direct-indirect burdens" test, by attempting something
less difficult of achievement, if more vaguely defined, than the absence
of competitive disadvantage for interstate commerce, escapes this com-
plexity.
Adoption of the rule of apportionment is subject to more serious
objections from the point of view of the practicability of its administra-
tion by the Court. From the inception of its application, at the level
of the state tax administrator, the process of apportionment is not an
easy one. An equitable method must be flexible enough to be applicable
to widely different kinds of taxpayers. Much must, in the end, be left
to the discretion of the tax administrator.62 More important, to the
extent that the states do not use uniform apportionment factors, there is
certain to be inequality of tax burden of the kind caused by differences
61. The reader can convince himself of this by considering the case of a perfect
apportionment by all the states involved. The interstate taxpayer would then pay an
amount strictly comparable to that paid by an intrastate enterprise if comparable local
enterprises in every state were subject to the same taxes, assessment rates, and tax
rates. Where there are substantial differences of this nature in the taxes applicable to
an interstate enterprise, it may carry an actual load equivalent to that of business
wholly within any one of the states in which it operates, but never equal to that of
local operators in all of those states. Restricting the right to tax to one state also
cannot put the interstate operator on a level of equality with intrastate competitors in
all the states in which it does business. That there are significant differences in tax
systems hardly requires demonstration.
62. "It would certainly be impossible to demonstrate any single system of alloca-
tion providing results that were correct in any economic sense. . . . The problem is as
difficult of solution as dividing the value of a pair of shears." Lynn Stiles (Supervisor
of Research and Railroad Assessor, Ill. Revenue Dept.), (1948) PRoc. NaT. Tax
Ass'N, 461-2. "We would be spared a great deal of nonsense about railroad allocation
if it were generally understood that there-is no 'correct' allocation formula-that the
allocation process is, of necessity, arbitrary." Ronald Welch (then of the Cal. State
Board of Equalization), id. at 469.
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in tax systems, and, since each state would probably employ those factors
most favorable to itself, such non-uniformity is most likely to result in
a disadvantage for the interstate enterprise.
Tax administrators have, through national organizations, attempted
to develop uniform apportionment formulas.68 Since statutes in many
states accord wide discretion to the administrator, 64 such efforts may
have a significant effect, although it is certainly too soon to draw valid
conclusions. Cooperation between state tax administrators is not enough
of itself to ensure uniformity Interstate cooperation at the level of
state legislatures is required, but since each state's desire and legitimate
need for revenue indicates non-uniformity, it is improbable that this can
be in any sense a final solution. The problem demands a clearly enunci-
ated standard which can be enforced upon the states, upon which appor-
tionment is to proceed. At present, the Supreme Court and the federal
court system are the only institutions performing this function.
Certainly the Court has displayed no enthusiasm for holding a tight
rein on the states. No apportionment scheme will be upset unless clearly
arbitrary, the burden of demonstrating arbitrariness is upon the tax-
payer.66 Only rarely has that burden been carried successfully in the
Supreme Court.66  It seems unlikely that the Court will go beyond its
enunciation of the basic standard. Mr. Justice Black's argument, then,
assumes that this is inadequate and that another group, congressional
or administrative, can accomplish more. With respect to Congress, the
question of whether political pressure to favor particular states might
1
63. For a net income tax formula see (1947) PRoc. NAT. TAX ASS'N 177, (1949)
PROC. NAT. TAX Ass'N 239; (1950) PROC. NAT. TAX Ass'N 349; (1951) PROC. NAT.
TAX Ass'N 456. For an "operating characteristics" formula for apportionment of
unit-assessed property taxes on railroads see REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 1947, 25;
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 1948, 38, REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 1949, 59. For an ap-
portionment formula applicable to property taxes on aircraft see note 50 supra.
A full answer to the question of how serious the problem of non-uniformity of
apportionment factors actually is would involve a close analysis of the methods of
apportionment in use with respect to these taxes. Such analysis lies beyond the scope
of this discussion. Cf., however, "[ulniformity of allocation factors is not a major
problem in railroad taxation. Far greater inequities occur in the matter of system
valuation. " Richard C. Beckett (General Attorney, Ill. Central Railroad Co.),
(1948) PRoc. NAT. TAx ASS'N, 4-58, and also H.R. Doc. No. 141, supra note 28, at
84-5.
64. See, e. g., the California statute on the corporate net income tax. CAL. REV-
ENUE AND TAXATION CODE (Deering), § 24301 (Supp. 1951).
65. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L "Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940), Un-
derwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
66. See Hans Rees Sons', Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931), Wallace
v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920). One case, Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275
(1919), invalidated an apportionment scheme for property taxes on railroad cars on the
ground that it was arbitrary.
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become overwhelming is certainly arguable. More generally, the need
for constant revision of apportionment factors as further experience
is gained, indicates that a permanent agency in the form of a federal
administrative body is required. Such a body, possessing the expertise
to determine apportionment factors and the power to compel uniformity
in their use, might well be more efficient than the Court.
67
The supposition that judicial administration would prove imprac-
ticable does not apply, however, to the "vessel" rule. The outstanding
feature of that rule is that, once the choice of the fortunate state is
made, administration is a problem neither for the state tax administrator
nor for the Court. Proponents of the "vessel" rule have made much
of the comparative ease of its application. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
the Northwest Airlines case, apparently recommended the extension of
the "vessel" rule to aircraft when he characterized the rule of apportion-
ment as "beset with friction, waste, and difficulties." 68 Mr. Justice
Minton, dissenting in Standard Oil v. Peck69 raised the specific objec-
tion that where, as in that case, ships move on rivers which form the
boundaries of several states, their location in any one state at any par-
ticular time is unascertainable.' Hence apportionment is impossible.
He agrees with Mr. Justice Black as to the impracticality of the rule of
apportionment but moves toward the "vessel" rule in the alternative
rather than toward congressional action. There is a basic objection to the
"vessel" rule, but it must be made on grounds other than administrative
feasibility.
Problems of the "Vessel" Rule
Reasonableness of a rule which reserves the privileges of taxation
to the domiciliary state in all cases, is, at least, questionable. 71  One can
hardly quarrel, however, with the proposition that some vehicles meander
so irregularly that they have substantial connection with no state, thus
making apportionment a practical impossibility as well as theoretically
unjustified from a due process point of view. In such situations choice
67. The problems of congressional or federal administrative action in this field
are discussed in Hellerstein and Hennefield, supra note 43; Sutherland and Virciguerra,
The Octroi and the Airplane, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1946); and H.R. Doc. No. 141,
supra note 28, at 47-51.
68. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944). Attribution
of hostility to the rule of apportionment to Mr. Justice Frankfurter must be qualified
by the fact that he voted for that rule in both the Ott and Peck cases. There is also
reason to believe that his Northwest Airlines opinion was a call for congressional action.
See H.R. Doc. No. 141, supra note 28, at 155.
69. 342 U.S. 382, 385 (1952).
70. Id. at 386.
71. See pp. 220-221 sapra.
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of the taxing state is, of necessity, somewhat arbitrary. The cogent
argument against the "vessel" rule is that this description does not fit
the overwhelming majority of situations involving watercraft or air-
craft. If state protection of their right of way has less importance for
watercraft owners than for railroad companies, the benefits bestowed at
terminals are not less substantial. This indicates that the factors by
which an apportionment of the value of a vessel or an airplane is made
should be, in most cases, terminal factors such as tons handled. 72
It is on the basis of such consideration that Mr. Justice Minton's
argument may be answered. He assumes that the only significant factors
in apportionment of the value of the vessels in the Peck case embody
time or distance within the taxing state's borders. If terminal factors
are better indices, then apportionment would find no difficulty in the case
of watercraft moving on a river-boundary between states. There is,
of course, room for disagreement as to the proper factors applicable.
The "vessel" rule's effect upon the general state interest in revenue
is perhaps as significant as any specific due process claims of non-domi-
ciliary states in requiring rejection of broad application of that rule.
In this respect the choice of domicile as the determinant of state right
to tax has, in an era of corporate enterprise, proven unfortunate. Since
the major states of corporate domicile7 3 exempt all tangibles from
property taxes, a large segment of the water carrier industry has been
substantially freed from all property taxation upon their vehicles. 74
Realization that vessels constitute a substantial portion of the total
investment of water carriers75 and that the great majority of these
operate interstate,76 induces the suspicion that there is an untapped vein
of revenue for the states in taxation of watercraft. Selection of a state
other than that of legal domicile, e.g., commercial domicile, for a rule of
the "vessel" type might increase state revenue considerably. Apportion-
ment would probably increase it even more.77
72. This is the type of formula proposed in H.R. Doc. No. 160, supra note 11, at
286-7, 296, for watercraft and the kind suggested for aircraft by the Nat. Ass'n of Tax
Administrators. See note 50 supra.
73. New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.
74. For evidence for this assertion and discussion of the problem see H.R. Doc. No.
160, supra note 11, at 278-9.
75. Id. at 268, 283.
76. Id. at 278.
77. Id. at 286, where the amount of revenue the states should gain from a shift,
either to "commercial' domicile" or to apportionment, is estimated. For a report of the
opinion of tax administrators and a discussion of defects of the "vessel" rule see H.R.
Doc. No. 141, supra note 28, at 45-47.
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Conchsion: Congress and the Court
Consideration of the enormous problem of the revenue needs of
state and local governments in the context of particular constitutional
limitations on the taxing powers of the states is, for many, beyond the
province of the judicial process. As a background to litigation, fiscal
requirements can perhaps create a presumption in favor of the states, but
decisions based upon them have passed from the determination of con-
stitutional principle to the exercise of the legislative function. Factors
of this nature lend appeal to Mr. justice Black's position. Standards for
apportionment may be provided by the due process clause; the decision to
apply a "vessel" or a "railroad" rule may be justified by reference to the
same principle. But if apportionment is to be applied consistently beyond
the field of property taxes on tangibles, an extensive reinterpretation of
precedents is necessary,78 and that reinterpretation would make due
process a consciously wielded instrument for determination of state tax
policy on a broad front. Beyond this, when the Court establishes rules
governing taxation of economic enterprises, it cannot ignore the effect
of its actions upon other nominally extra-constitutional matters. For
example, one consequence of the "vessel" rule has been to bestow upon
water carriers an advantage with respect to their air and land competi-
tors.7 9  Even if one grants that the administrative difficulties of appor-
tionment might be overcome, Mr. Justice Black's position still has appeal.
Should those difficulties prove insuperable, his argument would appear to
become convincing.
But the unverified assumption at the base of Mr. Justice Black's
thesis is that Congress can and will perform the function thrust upon it.
Aside from the impulses toward favoritism that would beset its path,
there is tremendous hostility to any entrance of federal power in this
area. Following the Northwest Airlines case, the Civil Aeronautics
Board was directed by Congress to prepare a report and recommenda-
tions on the subject of multiple taxation of air commerc*e. 80 That
report recommended the establishment of a federal agency to control
state apportionment schemes as an experiment to be followed by applica-
tion to taxes on other vehicles. Since its submission, several bills have
78. See p. 223, supra.
79. H.R. Doc. No. 141, supra note 11, at 33, 49-50, 284, 306. Concerning the problem
of government policy on this question see that study generally and H.R. Doc. No. 160,
supra note 28, at 34.
80. 58 STAT. 723 (1944), as amended, 58 STAT. 926 (1944). The report was pub-
lished at Multiple Taxation of Air Commerce, supra note 28. The recommendations are
found at pp. 45-51.
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been introduced on the subject.8 ' None have emerged from the com-
mittees to which they were referred.
The Court's adoption of the rule of apportionment now assumes a
more favorable light.8 2 The administrative problem is admittedly
formidable, and even partial solution requires working cooperation
between tax administrators who devise and apply apportionment schemes,
and the courts who declare and enforce the basic standard. That Con-
gress retains its power to enter this field is undoubted, but until and
unless it does, the responsibility for a workable solution rests with the
Court. Its most recent pronouncements indicate that it has accepted that
responsibility.
PROTECTION ACCORDED A PURCHASER OF LAND
FROM A DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLAINTIFF
Whenever rights in real property are being litigated, the land may
be privately sold or mortgaged to a stranger to the suit.1 Such trans-
action may occur before final judgment, after final judgment but pre-
ceding appeal, 2 during appeal, or subsequent to the time allowed for
appeal. Legislative and judicial stagnation necessitates an inquiry into
the protection afforded to purchaser after the time for appeal has run.
This investigation is thus limited in scope because a person buying
property through private sale during the time when an appeal may be
taken, is generally on constructive notice that an action relating to the
land is pending.3 The fundamental limitations upon which the buyer's
rights are contingent are the operation of lis pendens after the time
81. H.R. 3446, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 1241, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947) ; S. 2453, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) ; S. 420, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
82. Application of that rule is justified wherever the use of the vehicle in question
is such that there is a substantial connection with more than one state, without regard
for the fact that the vehicle is a railroad car, a water vessel, or an airplane. In this
connection, the limitation of the Ott and Peck holdings to vessels moving on inland
waters, see note 15 supra, hardly seems a priori justified for all cases of taxes on ocean-
going ships.
1. A private sale must be distinguished from a judicial sale with reference to the
rights of purchasers. The purpose of protecting a purchaser at a judicial sale is not
merely to keep land alienable, but primarily to promote bidding at public sales. Lord v.
Hawkins, 39 Minn. 73, 38 N.W. 689 (1888) ; Mach v. Blanchard, 15 S.D. 432, 90 N.W.
1042 (1902).
2. See the discussion of the rights of a purchaser where judgment is set aside
before time for appeal has run in Tainter, Restitution of Property Transferred Under
Void or Later Reversed Judgments. 9 Miss. L._. 157, 179 and n.133 (1936).
3. E.g., Maedel v. Wies, 309 Mich. 424, 15 N.W.2d 692 (1944); Stuart v. Coleman,
78 Okla. 81, 188 Pac. 1063 (1920).
230
